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UPDATED GUIDANCE ON CONSENT-TO-ASSIGN 




For decades it has been standard literature on oil and gas leases to note 
there is uncertainty regarding how a court may treat the violation of a 
consent-to-assign provision since, in Texas at least, such instruments are 
contractual “leases” in name only.
1
 Some commentators have advocated for 
courts to disregard their well-established nature as fee simple determinable 
property interests and instead, apply ordinary contract law on the basis it 
would be more fair to and in line with the expectation rights of individual 
landowners.
2
 Others (such as this author) anticipated courts would be more 
likely to adhere to traditional real property principles summarized in the 
Restatements of Property to limit application of—and at times invalidate—




                                                                                                             
 * The author is a solo practitioner—J. Wright Law PLLC (www.jwrightlaw.com)—
based in Collin County, Texas, who handles all kinds of commercial disputes with a keen 
interest in oil and gas matters. 
 1. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2003). 
 2. See, e.g., Luke Meier & Rory Ryan, The Validity of Restraints on Alienation in an 
Oil and Gas Lease, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2015–16) (arguing that property law 
“labels … should not be mechanically applied to resolve the validity of restraints in an oil 
and gas lease.”). 
 3. See, e.g., T. Ray Guy & Jason E. Wright, The Enforceability of Consent-to-Assign 
Provisions in Texas Oil and Gas Leases, 71 SMU L. Rev. 477 (2018); Mark K. Glasser & 
Scott Humphrey, The Assignment of Oil & Gas Leases: Conditions, Constraints, and 
Consequences, in CTR. FOR AM. & INT’L L., 62ND ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L., at 37-38 
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A recent decision issued by the Federal District Court in Amarillo 
appears to be first to weigh in on the debate, although flying a bit under the 
radar given it was issued in the midst of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 
The opinion is worthwhile reading if you are an oil and gas practitioner in 
Texas since—although not binding on a state court where most issues are 
likely to be hashed out—the analysis provides a well-reasoned path for any 
court to follow in assessing the enforceability of all types of consent 
provisions and, further, collects a number of factors to consider in regard to 
what may make a lessor’s refusal to give consent improper. The court’s 
opinion will at least give commentators something new to write about going 
forward.  
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. BP America 
Production Company,
4
 Judge Matthew J. Kacsmaryk of the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas (Amarillo Division) was called 
upon to determine—in the context of a preliminary injunction hearing—the 
enforceability of a consent-to-assign provision. The provision provided the 
defendant-lessee, BP America, could not transfer its rights to anyone 
“except upon the written approval” of the plaintiff-lessor, the Mayo 
Foundation, but with a further condition that such “approval shall not be 
unreasonably withheld.”
5
 As discussed in a previous article by this author, 
such consent provisions in a real property context appear to be generally 




Turns out, the Plaintiff in Mayo Foundation (who acquired its status by 
charitable devise) had a particular aversion to the existing operator of 
certain wells, Courson Oil & Gas Inc. Courson happened to have a 
preferential right of purchase in its operating agreement with BP America 
and exercised that right when Latigo Petroleum LLC (which, to muddy the 
water further, was owned in part by the Mayo Foundation) made an offer to 
purchase the lease from BP America. Courson also apparently had a history 
of litigation with the Mayo Foundation over their oil and gas issues already. 
When BP America came calling for lessor consent after Courson stepped in 
to exercise its preferential rights, the Mayo Foundation naturally declined. 
For unknown reason, it seems BP America concluded it did not actually 
need consent as a legal matter either way and so, upon giving notice of its 
                                                                                                             
(2011), available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d574433a-4d41-4483-
9375-6ef6a0e73f11. 
 4. 447 F. Supp. 3d 522 (N.D. Tex. 2020). 
 5. Id. at 526. 
 6. See Guy & Wright, supra note 4, at 499-500. 
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intent to move forward, the Mayo Foundation filed suit seeking an 
injunction to prevent the sale to Courson. That was the best and perhaps 
only course of action for the lessor to take since, if waiting to see what 
transpired, the Mayo Foundation would have then been subject to a host of 
other defenses like waiver or laches.
7
  
At the outset of the opinion, after summarizing the history of the land 
and somewhat convoluted facts, the court cut through it all to recognize two 
threshold legal issues: (1) was the consent-to-assign provision even valid at 
all and, (2) if so, did the Mayo Foundation “reasonably” withhold its 
consent in the circumstances.
8
 Significant case law on both issues exists for 
ordinary contracts and landlord-tenant matters, but there is little in regard to 
what Judge Kacsmaryk called the “chimera” of an oil and gas lease. As he 
noted vividly: “[T]he legal landscape on this question is less populated than 
the Panhandle tract at issue in this case.”
9
 
Nonetheless the court immediately reached the same conclusion as this 
author, and others, regarding the source of law for answering the questions: 
i.e., Texas state courts would look to the Restatements to apply traditional 
property principles and not ordinary contract law since the chimera at issue 
is unquestionably a fee simple determinable in Texas.
10
  
As such, Judge Kacsmaryk went on to rule that, as determined by 
reference to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.4, 
comment d (as well as the Texas Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements 
on interpreting language in certain oil and gas contracts),
11
 a provision 
requiring consent which cannot be “unreasonably” withheld is a valid 
promissory restraint because the restriction facially does not bar alienation 
to all possible transferees.
12
 Interestingly, although dicta, the court 
contrasted such a result with the language of the lease when held by the 
original landowner—stating no assignment could ever be made at all—
                                                                                                             
 7. See id. at 495-96. 
 8. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 529. 
 9. Id. at 530. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The Mayo Foundation court offers a summary on the rules of contract interpretation 
otherwise applicable to Texas oil and gas leases, which in short can be articulated as: (1) 
look to plain meaning first; (2) if the plain meaning is ambiguous, apply the canon of 
construction against surplusage to find an interpretation that harmonizes with the rest of the 
lease; (3) if still ambiguous, a court may investigate the parties’ intent in drafting; but, (4) it 
is not appropriate to rely on industry usage or custom to add a nonessential term. Id. at 530-
31 (citing, among other decisions, the recent Barrow-Shaver Resources Co. v. Carrizo Oil & 
Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 479 (Tex. 2019)). 
 12. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 532. 
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Mayo Foundation thus confirms the conclusion of those anticipating that 
the public policy interests baked into real property law would prevail over 
individual freedom of contract preferences despite any perceived (or real) 
unfairness to individual landowners; leading to the following general 
guidelines as to the various types of consent-to-assign provisions that may 
be found in an oil and gas lease:  
$ Promissory restraints (covenants not to transfer) – can be valid 
or invalid depending on the language, but are not a real 
hindrance either way given the remedy for breach is damages 
and, in some cases, they can subject the lessor to substantial 
liability and damages if not acting reasonably. 
$ Disabling restraints (seeking to “void” a transfer) – are always 
deemed invalid as a matter of law. 
$ Forfeiture restraints (elimination of lease rights for violation) – 
are invalid except in the exceedingly unusual circumstance 
where a lessor negotiated to prevent one particular company 
from acquiring the mineral rights and also retained a right of 
reversion to remedy the violation.  
More detail on the nuances, with strategies to consider in various scenarios, 
can be found in a prior article co-authored with T. Ray Guy published by 
the SMU Law Review in 2018.
14
 
After answering the question of enforceability, the Mayo Foundation 
court proceeded on to where virtually none other in Texas has gone before: 
assessing whether or not consent was reasonably withheld in the context of 
an oil and gas lease and, if not, the consequences for doing so. As Judge 
Kacsmaryk highlighted further in that regard: “[i]f the Texas jurisprudence 
on the first question of validity is sparsely populated, the Texas 




                                                                                                             
 13. Id. 
 14. See Guy & Wright, supra note 4, at 497-504. 
 15. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 532 (emphasis in original). That is presumably in reference to oil 
and gas leases only, as there are well-known standards for what is commercially reasonable 
in the context of contracts and landlord-tenant leases. See, e.g., 29 WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 74:22 (4th ed. 2017) (listing factors and noting: “Denying consent solely on 
the basis of personal taste, convenience, or sensibility is not commercially reasonable. It is 
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Searching for guidance, Judge Kacsmaryk looked to case law in other 
states, oil and gas treatises, and law review articles to determine what 
factors to consider in deciding whether lessor (the Mayo Foundation) acted 
reasonably in withholding its consent. The court found the possible factors 
to consider might include: 
$ The proposed assignee’s (Courson’s) solvency and record on 
making timely royalty payments; 
$ The proposed assignee’s reputation in the industry for honesty 
and reliability; 
$ The proposed assignee’s prior working relationship with the 
lessor; 
$ The proposed assignee’s capacity to operate the leasehold in an 
efficient manner; 
$ Whether the proposed assignee is a “lease flipper” who will not 
actively develop the property; 
$ Whether the proposed assignee would increase non-cost bearing 
interests, such as overriding royalties and production payments; 
and 
$ Possibly, based on one law review article at least, whether the 
proposed assignee is a competitor of the lessor.
16
 
In the procedural posture of a preliminary injunction hearing, it was on 
the plaintiff (the Mayo Foundation) to prove, among other elements, that it 
was “substantially likely to succeed on the merits of its underlying cause.”
17
 
The court did not say what the burden should be as to the balance of factors 
but one can presume it would fall on the side of not preventing a transfer 




                                                                                                             
also unreasonable to deny consent in order that the landlord may charge a higher rent than 
originally contracted for, since the lessor’s desire for a better bargain than contracted for has 
nothing to do with the permissible purposes of the restraint on alienation, that is, to protect 
the lessor’s interest in the preservation of the property and the performance of the lease 
covenants.”). 
 16. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 532-33. 
 17. Id. at 528. 
 18. See Robbins v. HNG Oil Co., 878 S.W.2d 351, 363 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, 
writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“But it is Hornbook law and an axiomatic rule that restraints on 
alienation are squarely contrary to public policy and are forbidden and disallowed.”); see 
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Considering the evidence submitted in the flurry of pre-injunction 
filings, Judge Kacsmaryk found the Mayo Foundation did not satisfy its 
burden to show consent was “reasonably” withheld because, despite the 
general animosity and litigation history no doubt documented well in its 
briefings, there was insufficient evidence to legitimately conclude the 
proposed assignee (Courson) was such an incapable oil and gas operator to 
justify preventing a transfer on public policy grounds.
19
 It could be said, in 
essence, all the factors identified by the court pertain to that policy interest 
of making sure real property is put to its highest and best use. Withholding 
consent simply because one does not like a proposed assignee or for any 
other individualized purposes—such as extracting a “consent fee” or 
otherwise exploiting the desire or need of a lessee to transfer its rights to 
someone who appears willing and able to develop the property rights—is 
certainly not one of the factors identified in Mayo Foundation. Ultimately, 
the court found only one possible factor “weigh[ed] decisively” in the 
Mayo Foundation’s favor under the circumstances of that case: Courson 
could be considered a “direct competitor” of the lessor—at least, in the 
sense that, the Mayo Foundation was part owner of its preferred transferee, 
Latigo Petroleum LLC.
20
 But that was still not enough for Judge 
Kacsmaryk to pump the brakes on a transfer and wait for further 
development of the case through litigation because he noted that no other 
state or federal court had ever adopted such a rule.
21
 Plus, the fact that 
damages were available, as discussed below, likely factored into the 
Judge’s thought process. In this author’s opinion, it is extremely unlikely 
any court would ever adopt such a rule either because: (1) Mayo 
Foundation presented a unique factual scenario and (2) allowing consent to 
be withheld for an entity that has (or takes) an ownership interest in some 
preferred transferee opens up the door to all kinds of “injurious 
                                                                                                             
also Griffin v. Griffin, No. 10-08-00327-CV, 2010 WL 140383, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco 
Jan. 13, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting the principle is considered “well-settled in this 
state prior to 1909”) (citing Diamond v. Rotan, 124 S.W. 196, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Texarkana 1909, writ ref’d) (“That a general restraint upon the power of alienation, when 
incorporated in a deed or will otherwise conveying a fee-simple right to the property is void, 
is now too well settled to require discussion.”)); Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug Co., 884 S.W.2d 
853, 862 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ) (explaining three purposes of restraints against 
alienation). 
 19. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 533. 
 20. Id. at 533-34. 
 21. Id. 
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consequences” for which property law has developed the general 
presumption against restraints on alienation in the first place.
22
   
In the end, the Mayo Foundation ruling was based not only on a 
determination that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of showing a 
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits, but also because it could 
not prove the second element of a preliminary injunction—that the movant 
would suffer irreparable harm.
23
 Judge Kacsmaryk, with an obvious flair for 
descriptive writing, noted that damages at law would still be available to the 
Mayo Foundation even if it turned out Courson were to “cheat Plaintiff on 
royalties, strip mine the surface, and negligently permit all well heads to 
rust to dust.”
24
 That is very much in line with the conclusion from the 
Restatement that breach of a promissory restraint, as no more than a 
covenant or promise, is not actually much of a hindrance to accomplishing 
transfers with or without lessor consent.
25
 
In sum, in this author’s view at least, the decision in Mayo Foundation is 
a thorough and well-written (if not entertaining at times) legal opinion that 
provides further support for the conclusion that consent-to-assign 
provisions in Texas oil and gas leases should be treated with respect. It also 
provides, however, that no lessee or prospective purchaser should 
necessarily feel constrained to cave into unreasonable demands of a 
property owner/lessor bent on holding up a transaction due to their own 
personal whims or desire to obtain additional compensation by way of a 
“consent fee” or otherwise. The public policy goals of property law prevail 
over individual contract rights when it comes to Texas oil and gas leases. 
 
                                                                                                             
 22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4, cmt. c (identifying the 
following “injurious consequences” as reasons not to enforce a restraint against alienation: 
(1) ”impediments to the operation of a free market in land;” (2) “limiting the prospects for 
improvement, development, and redevelopment” of the land; (3) “demoralization costs 
associated with subordinating the desires of current landowners to the desires of past 
owners;” (4) “frustrating the expectations that normally flow from land ownership;” and (5) 
placing one party “in a position to take unfair advantage of another’s need or desire to 
transfer property”). 
 23. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 528. 
 24. Id. at 535 (citing authority for rights of a lessor to bring “multiple causes for 
damages … to be made whole for violation of assorted implied covenants in Texas oil and 
gas leases”). 
 25. See Guy & Wright, supra note 4, at 490 (concluding the violation of a promissory 
restraint by transferring without consent “would most likely subject the assignor to damages, 
which in many instances would be nonexistent with a simple change in identity of the 
lessee”). 
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